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Abstract
The paper provides an overview of the development and
implementation of Australia’s comprehensive ‘border pro-
tection’ policy, including the Pacific Solution and Opera-
tion Relex – the interdiction of asylum seekers. The
intention of the paper is to demonstrate the lengths to
which a developed state will go in addressing the interre-
lated problems of secondary movement, people smuggling
and mixed flows. It also highlights the ‘export value’ of
the policy and its wider implications.
Résumé
Cet article propose un survol du développement et de la
mise en vigueur de la politique intégrée australienne de
« défense des frontières », y compris la Solution du Pacifi-
que et Relex – l’interdiction des demandeurs d’asile. L’ar-
ticle vise à montrer jusqu’où un état avancé est disposé à
aller pour confronter les problèmes connexes de mouve-
ment secondaire, de la traite des gens et des flots mixtes.
Il met aussi en exergue la valeur « à l’export » de cette politi-
que et ses applications possibles dans d’autres domaines.
I. Introduction
A
ustralia is not normally considered to be a country
facing a refugee or asylum seeker “problem.” Cer-
tainly, by European or African standards, the
number of asylum seekers and refugees arriving on Austra-
lian shores in any year is minuscule. However, the high
profile rescue by the MV Tampa of over 400 people attempt-
ing to reach Australia and claim asylum catapulted the
Australian treatment of asylum seekers onto the world stage.
The MV Tampa saga provided the impetus for the introduc-
tion by the Australian government of a new policy approach
to “unauthorized arrivals.” The catchphrase for this new
policy was the “Pacific Solution” and entailed the use of
neighbouring Pacific states as refugee holding pens and a
concerted naval interdiction campaign. Unlike the MV
Tampa incident, which has been the subject of considerable
academic discussion,1 Australia’s naval interdiction cam-
paign (known  as “Operation Relex”) has received scant
consideration, despite having potentially significant ramifi-
cations for the treatment of asylum seekers by other Western
states.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of
the development and implementation of Australia’s “bor-
der protection” policy, including the Pacific Solution and
Operation Relex. Whilst the policy raises significant ques-
tions about Australia’s compliance with international obli-
gations owed to asylum seekers and refugees and the legality
of certain activities at sea, it is not the purpose of this paper
to canvass these in any detail. Rather, the intention is to
demonstrate the lengths to which a developed state will go
in addressing the interrelated problems of secondary move-
ment, people smuggling, and mixed flows. In the case of
Australia, ensuring the sanctity of its borders in a climate
of heightened security fears took primacy over its obligation
to abide by the spirit, if not the letter, of the Refugee Con-
vention.2 The “export value” of Australia’s new policy
means that the ‘Pacific Solution’ may have an impact on the
nature of asylum regimes around the world.3
II. Australian Government Responses to
Unauthorized Arrivals
As a relatively young country, Australia has relied heavily on
immigration to achieve population and economic growth.
More than six million people have come to Australia as
migrants since 1945.4 Australia has a well-developed and
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strictly controlled immigration system, which includes a
universal visa system for all non-citizens coming to Austra-
lia. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA)5 is responsible for the admini-
stration of Australia’s official migration program, including
the humanitarian and refugee intake.
Australia is a signatory to both the Refugee Convention
and the 1967 Protocol,6 which together shall be referred to
as the Refugee Convention. Historically, Australia has reset-
tled large numbers of refugees and other persons of hu-
manitarian concern from overseas camps; it remains one of
only a handful of active “resettlement” countries.7 Unlike
many other countries, however, Australia has not faced
mass influxes of refugees or large numbers of asylum seek-
ers arriving in its territory. This has enabled Australia to
tightly control all aspects of its immigration program, in-
cluding refugee numbers. The arrival of increasing num-
bers of asylum seekers on Australia’s shores presented a real
challenge to this “culture of control.”8
The Australian government’s policy and legislation on
unauthorized arrivals has historically displayed an acute
bias towards boat arrivals, rather than those arriving “ille-
gally” by air. This is so, in spite of the fact that, until the late
1990s, unauthorized air arrivals outstripped unauthorized
boat arrivals to Australia. The fear of immigrants from
Australia’s populous northern neighbours flooding
through porous and unprotected coastal borders looms
large in Australian mythology.
The first  significant  Australian  government action to
combat increasing unauthorized arrivals was in response to
the arrival of Indochinese refugees in the early 1990s. The
Australian government amended the Migration Act 1958
(Cth) to provide for the mandatory detention of the Indo-
chinese “boat people” in 1992.9 Boat arrivals throughout
the 1990s remained very low; however, there was a sharp
increase in 1998–99. One explanation for this change was
the increase in people smuggling activities in the region,
largely  moving Afghan, Iranian, and Iraqi refugees  and
asylum seekers. Despite being cast as undeserving “queue
jumpers,” the vast majority (90 per cent of arrivals from
1998 to 2001)10 of unauthorized boat arrivals demonstrate
that they are refugees in need of protection and have been
successful in their claim for asylum in Australia.
Since 1999, increasingly restrictive practices in relation
to unauthorized arrivals in general, and people smuggling
in particular, have been introduced by the Australian gov-
ernment. These practices culminated in the implementa-
tion of a comprehensive border protection (read “refugee
control”) strategy in September 2001 – the so-called “Pa-
cific Solution.” As of 6 November 2003, there had been only
three unauthorized boat arrivals in Australia (two from
Vietnam with fewer than one hundred people in total and
one carrying fourteen Turkish Kurds), since 16 December
2001.
A. The Development of the Border Protection Strategy
In 1999, two vessels carrying unauthorized arrivals landed,
undetected, on the east coast of mainland Australia. Boat
arrivals had previously only landed in Australia’s remote
northern reaches and offshore territories. Australia has a
number of island territories to its north, including Christ-
mas Island, Ashmore Reef, and Cocos Island, all of which
are proximate to Indonesia, a major transit country for
people smuggling to Australia. In response to these arrivals,
the Australian government created the Coastal Surveillance
Task Force (CSTF) to make recommendations on the
strengthening of Australia’s coastal surveillance procedures
and systems. This was the first step towards the creation and
implementation of the Pacific Solution.
The CSTF recommended a  four-year,  A$124 million
program to “strengthen Australia’s capacity to detect and
deter illegal arrivals,”11 which was accepted by the govern-
ment. One of the specific recommendations was the need
for a coordinated administrative approach to unauthorized
arrivals. This led to the creation of a second task force in
late 1999 – the Unauthorized Arrivals in Australia Task
Force (UATF) – which was to report on:
issues of international cooperation to combat irregular migra-
tion and people smuggling; measures to bolster the interna-
tional protection framework; and steps to improve
coordination and efficiency  among  Australian Government
agencies.12
The UATF report resulted in the adoption of a “compre-
hensive and integrated unauthorized arrivals strategy.”13
There are three key elements to this strategy: prevention of
irregular migration; disruption of people smugglers and
their clients en route; and the development of “appropriate
reception arrangements.” Much of the unauthorized arri-
vals strategy developed by the UATF remains in place today;
however, it has been modified and extended over time,
particularly in late 2001.
The prevention of irregular migration involved:
• the use of targeted aid funding to help eliminate “push
factors” in key source countries (Afghanistan and Pakistan
in particular);
• the implementation of domestic and international infor-
mation campaigns;
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• increased technical co-operation, capacity building, and
information exchange with key source countries (focusing
on the Middle East), and
• efforts to increase international co-operation on irregular
migration and people smuggling.
Strategies aimed at disrupting people smugglers in-
cluded the posting of additional compliance and airline
liaison officers in overseas locations; technical co-operation
and capacity building with key transit countries in the
region;14 improved  intelligence gathering and  exchange;
and increased efforts to obtain regional co-operation on the
interception of irregular migrants. The most comprehen-
sive regional co-operation model implemented to date is
with Indonesia – the key transit country for unauthorized
boat arrivals to Australia.
The final aspect of the strategy was coordinated recep-
tion arrangements in Australia. This comprised a contin-
ued commitment to the use of mandatory detention
(including the establishment of the remote detention cen-
tres in the desert regions of Australia), improved processing
times, negotiations with countries of origin and first asylum
for the return of failed asylum seekers, and a raft of legisla-
tive amendments “to reduce the incentives of using Austra-
lian refugee law to achieve a migration outcome.”15
III. Refugee Controls and Border Protection
The unauthorized arrival strategy saw no immediate reduc-
tion in the number of boat arrivals. It appears to have been
effective in easing the general upwards trend in unauthor-
ized air arrivals, which comprised about a third of all un-
authorized arrivals in the 1999–2000 financial year.
However, the number of boat arrivals in 1999–2000 and
2000–01 remained relatively steady, at around 4,000 annu-
ally. Despite the unauthorized arrivals strategy having been
in place for two years, there was a strong feeling amongst
senior government representatives that people smugglers
saw Australia as a “soft touch.”
A. The MV Tampa and the Pacific Solution
The sense that the unauthorized arrivals strategy was not
achieving its aim was strengthened by the arrival of 1,212
people in six boats in the first three weeks of August 2001.16
The boats arrived at the Australian offshore territories of
Ashmore Reef and Christmas Island. In accordance with the
established policy (and authorized by the Migration Act 1958
(Cth)) all of these boats were detained and the people on
board were taken to detention centres on mainland Australia
for immigration processing.17 However, this policy was to
soon change.
On 26 August 2001, the Norwegian flagged freighter MV
Tampa rescued in excess of 400 people from a twenty-metre
wooden fishing vessel that was sinking about 140 kilome-
tres north of Christmas Island. The rescue had occurred at
the request of Australian authorities, who believed there
were approximately eighty people on board the sinking
vessel. The “rescuees,” as they became known, were mostly
from Afghanistan, having departed Indonesia by boat to
seek asylum in Australia.18
The captain of the MV Tampa, Captain Arne Rinnan,
intended to return the rescuees to Indonesia; however,
several of the asylum seekers made threats to harm them-
selves if they were not taken to Australia. Captain Rinnan
decided to change course for Christmas Island. Upon
reaching Christmas Island, the MV Tampa was denied
entry to Australian territorial waters.19 A standoff ensued
and the MV Tampa sat just outside Australian territorial
waters for three days.
During that time, the rescuees were housed on the deck
of the ship, with only empty cargo containers for shelter.
Many were suffering dehydration, some quite severely.
Captain Rinnan informed the Australian government that
if the medical situation on board was not addressed imme-
diately, people would die shortly. The Australian govern-
ment did not respond to requests for medical assistance,
food, and the removal of the sickest people.20
At about 11.30 a.m. on Thursday, 29 August, Captain
Rinnan decided to enter Australian waters and stopped
about four nautical miles off the coast of Christmas Island.
He determined not to leave until the humanitarian situ-
ation was addressed and the “rescuees” allowed to disem-
bark. The Australian government response was swift and
decisive. In around one hour, it ordered forty-five armed
SAS (Special Air Services) troops to board the MV Tampa
and closed the port at Christmas Island to incoming and
outgoing traffic.
Soon after the boarding by SAS personnel, Prime Minis-
ter John Howard announced that not one of the “rescuees”
on board the MV Tampa would set foot on Australian soil.21
The government decision was the subject of legal proceed-
ings in the Federal Court of Australia, which initially deter-
mined that the “rescuees” were being unlawfully detained
by the government.22 This decision was overturned, by
majority, on appeal.23
While the court proceedings were being heard, the gov-
ernment obtained the agreement of the impoverished Pa-
cific island nation of Nauru to house the MV Tampa
“rescuees,” in exchange for significant aid contributions
and debt write-offs.24 In addition, New Zealand agreed to
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accept 150 rescuees – primarily women, children, and fam-
ily groups – for processing.25
The “rescuees” were removed from the MV Tampa and
transported to Nauru on board HMAS Manoora, an Aus-
tralian warship. Upon arrival in Nauru, they were detained
in compounds managed by the International Organization
for Migration (IOM).26 The UNHCR accepted a request
from Nauru for assistance in the processing of asylum
claims of those rescued from the MV Tampa.27 All costs
associated with the housing, detention, and processing of
the rescuees on Nauru, including those incurred by the
UNHCR, were to be met by the Australian government.28
The government’s response to the MV Tampa situation
was coordinated through the creation of a high-level, inter-
departmental committee to be known as the People Smug-
gling Taskforce (PSTF) on 27 September 2001. The PSTF
was created partly in response to the MV Tampa, and partly
due to intelligence suggesting there were a range of boats
planning to come to Australia from Indonesia in the near
future. These two issues required there be a “concerted
focus” on what was happening and the possible govern-
ment responses.29
Despite being an ad hoc response to the MV Tampa
incident, the establishment of the PSTF signalled a change
to a “whole of government” approach to the question of
unauthorized arrivals and people smuggling. Prior to this
time, intelligence exchange and liaison about potential boat
arrivals had occurred at the working level between DIMIA,
the Australian  Federal  Police  (AFP) and  Coastwatch  (a
branch of the Australian Customs Service). It was also to
signal the start of a new government policy on boat arrivals
and people smuggling.
The arrival of further boatloads of asylum seekers saw
the Australian government extend its so-called “Pacific
Solution” to a second compound on Nauru and a third
compound on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea.30 These
too were managed by IOM. However, the UNHCR refused
to process any of these further arrivals. Instead, the Austra-
lian government established a new offshore processing re-
gime using DIMIA officials. The Nauru facilities were used
primarily for Afghan asylum seekers and Manus Island for
Iraqis. The Australian government once again met all costs
associated with these “offshore processing centres.” On the
question of costs, the Select Committee concluded that:
Although substantial information is available on the costs asso-
ciated with the operation of the offshore processing centres in
Nauru and Papua New Guinea, the Committee has not been
able to collate an accurate picture of the full cost of the Pacific
Solution. The substantive difficulty arises from the inability to
fully identify the cost of the activities of the Australian Defence
Force in support of the arrangements.31
The Committee does quantify the non-Defence related
costs of the Pacific Solution, which total in excess of A$250
million.32 These expenses relate to the reception and proc-
essing of 1,515 asylum seekers in Nauru and Papua New
Guinea. According to DIMIA, the estimated average cost
for each unauthorized arrival that is processed in Australia
is $29,000.33 This means that if all the asylum seekers taken
to Nauru and Papua New Guinea had been processed in
Australia, the average total cost would have been around
A$44 million.
The Select Committee noted that:
[I]t is apparent that the cost of the Pacific Solution processing
arrangements on Nauru and Manus to date, including addi-
tional aid funding, have been significantly more expensive than
onshore processing of the same number of people. This is true
even without a full accounting of the cost of the supporting
services provided by the Defence Force.34
B. To Deter and Deny – Operation Relex
The MV Tampa incident marked the introduction of a new
comprehensive border protection regime, of which the “Pa-
cific Solution” formed a part. Central to this regime was
“Operation Relex,” an Australian Defence Force (ADF) mis-
sion with the aim of deterring and denying boats suspected
of carrying asylum seekers from entering Australian territo-
rial waters.
On 28 August 2001,35 the Chief of Defence Forces issued
a warning order initiating Operation Relex. It specified that
the ADF mission was to “deter unauthorized boat arrivals
from entering Australian territorial waters off the north
west coast and offshore territories” by providing:
a maritime patrol and response option to detect, intercept and
warn vessels carrying unauthorized arrivals for the purpose of
deterring suspected illegal entry vessels from entering Austra-
lian territorial waters.36
Operation Relex formed part of the “whole of govern-
ment” approach to the issue of unauthorized arrivals and
people smuggling. As such, ADF operations were only a
part of the overall strategy, which comprised a continuum
of operations:
• intelligence gathering and analysis in preparation for pos-
sible boat departures from Indonesia, usually by non-ADF
personnel;
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• surveillance of the areas in which approaches to Australia
would be likely;
• naval interception of any suspected illegal entry vessels
(SIEVs) once close to Australia’s contiguous zone;
• the provision of warnings to the crew not to enter Austra-
lian waters;
• if the SIEV proceeded into the Australian contiguous zone,
the insertion of a boarding party, with the aim of removing
the boat to the high seas;
• the eventual detention of any SIEV that persisted in its
attempts to enter Australian territorial waters; and
• the transfer of detained SIEVs to a designated holding area,
pending a government determination on transfer and/or
transportation.
This policy was later amended to include the forcible
return of vessels to Indonesia.
1. Surveillance and interception of SIEVs
Prior to the MV Tampa incident, surveillance of Australia’s
northern approaches was the responsibility of Coastwatch,
a branch of the Australian Customs Service. However, under
Operation Relex,  the lead responsibility for surveillance
within the area of operations was held by Defence.
The surveillance conducted by Defence consisted of air
surveillance from the Australian mainland to within thirty
miles of the Indonesian archipelago, coupled with the po-
sitioning of naval vessels closer to Australian territory.37
We [Defence] had a standard operating procedure, which we
developed for this operation. That involved ships intercepting
an illegal vessel, either primarily by the ship itself or after having
been detected by the aircraft that were in surveillance.38
Coastwatch was responsible for the “residual national
surveillance program … and the provision of support for
Defence in the Operation Relex areas in the Timor and
Arafura Sea approaches.”39
SIEVs would be intercepted on the high seas, generally
in the vicinity of Christmas Island or Ashmore Reef. De-
fence personnel only had authority to board the vessels
once they entered Australia’s contiguous zone, which com-
mences twenty-four nautical miles from land. Intercep-
tions could occur much further out than twenty-four
nautical miles; however, naval vessels would then have to
shadow the SIEV until it entered the contiguous zone before
any action could be taken. For this reason, and in order to
militate against the risk of another SIEV slipping through,
naval vessels were not positioned too far “up threat.”40
Naval frigates were not directly involved in the intercep-
tion and boarding of SIEVs. Rather, rigid hull inflatable
boats (RHIBs) were sent forward to meet the SIEV with the
frigate remaining positioned  downstream,  just  over  the
horizon. This approach was designed to minimize the risk
of a safety-of-life-at-sea situation being generated. There was
a fear that the sight of a large vessel capable of rescuing all
persons on board the SIEV would be the catalyst for attempts
to sabotage the SIEV, thereby creating a rescue situation.41
2. Warning issued to crew
Upon interception of an SIEV, the personnel on board the
RHIB would issue a warning to the master of the vessel, if
one was identified, or otherwise to the crew.42 The warning
advised that the master and/or crew would be breaching
Australian law if they proceeded into Australian territory
and that they would be subject to severe penalties under that
law.43 The text of the warning was provided in both English
and Bahasa (Indonesian), given that the crews were invari-
ably Indonesian nationals. The warning advised that people
smuggling was a criminal offence in Australia subject to
mandatory jail terms and large fines. It recommended the
crew turn the boat around and return to Indonesia.
Whether or not the warning was comprehended by the
crew or the asylum seekers on board the SIEVs is unknown;
however, it was assumed by Australian officials that the
warning was read and understood.44 It appears that in every
instance the warnings were ineffective in stopping the boats
from continuing towards Australian waters.45 No specific
warning was issued to the asylum seekers on board the
vessels about their likely treatment upon arrival in Aus-
tralia.
3. Boarding of SIEVs
The naval vessel would then shadow the SIEV as it proceeded
towards the Australian contiguous zone. Warnings would
continue to be given to the vessel, in preparation for board-
ing. The boarding of the SIEV could be either compliant or
non-compliant. Where the boarding  was compliant the
SIEV was often broken down and in need of assistance, or
else responded to a request to heave to, allowing the inser-
tion of the boarding party. In the case of a non-compliant
boarding, requests to heave to were usually ignored, requir-
ing more forceful measures to be used to embark the board-
ing party. In at least one instance, machine gun warning
shots were fired into the water ahead of the SIEV and a
searchlight was used to illuminate both the weapon firer and
the area in the water ahead of the vessel where the rounds
were to land.46 Other tactics included manoeuvring the naval
vessel close to the SIEV to create a distraction, allowing “an
assault type non-compliant boarding, using the RHIB, to be
effected whilst the vessel was still under way.”47
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Once embarked, the boarding party commandeered the
ship and prevented any further damage being occasioned
to the vessel.48 Initially, the boarding party comprised naval
personnel only. As Operation Relex progressed, it was de-
cided that an armed presence in the boarding party was
required in order to ensure control of the vessel.49 This
armed presence was known as the Transit Security Element
(TSE) and included members of the Australian Army.
Members of the boarding party were armed with a hol-
stered pistol and a baton.50 The Rules of Engagement (ROE)
for Operation Relex stipulated the level of force which the
boarding parties were authorized to use.51 Whilst the weap-
ons carried by the boarding party were visible, personnel
were not authorized to use lethal force except in self-de-
fence. The members of the boarding party were advised that
the use of force should always be consistent with the situ-
ation they found themselves in and should be kept to a
minimum.52
A range of options for controlling people on board the
vessels was employed. The naval personnel were trained in
the used of batons. The army personnel also carried and
were trained to use capsicum spray and electricians’ cable
ties to temporarily restrain people. Both of these methods
of  controlling  the situation  were used  in the  course of
Operation Relex.53
The boarding party would include at least one engineer
who would inspect the engine and other members of the
boarding party would assess the hull and other parts of the
vessel.54 The boarding party would then assess the me-
chanical engineering, navigational equipment, and gen-
eral seaworthiness of the SIEV, and any minor repairs
necessary to ensure continued seaworthiness would also
be made.55 The boarding party would also provide basic
medical assistance and estimate the number of passengers
on board.
Once a boarding had been effected, the established policy
was to
reinforce the warning and turn the vessel around and either
steam it out of our contiguous zone ourselves under its own
power or – as had happened on a number of occasions – if the
engine had been sabotaged in our process of boarding, we
would then tow the vessel outside our contiguous zone into
international waters.56
The boarding party would remain on the SIEV until it
reached the outer limit of the Australian contiguous zone,
at which point it would return to the naval vessel. The naval
vessel would closely escort the SIEV, if it was not under tow,
until the Indonesian twenty-four nautical mile limit, at
which point it would instruct the vessel to continue back
towards Indonesia. The naval vessel would then withdraw
over the horizon, outside the nominal visual range and
would monitor the SIEV using an electro-optical tracking
system. The SIEVs “invariably just turned around and came
back again.”57
According to Rear Admiral Smith, the “initial policy was
to do that up to three times and, after having done it the
third time, to seek further advice from government”58 about
what to do with the vessel. The decision about what was to
happen with the SIEV was one made by government, again
through the PSTF process.
4. Containment of SIEVs and transportation
Initially, any SIEV which persisted in its attempts to enter
Australia, or which foundered whilst attempting to enter
Australia, was contained by the ADF until a decision was
made as to where the boat and/or passengers were to be
taken. The circumstances of containment varied for each
SIEV and are outlined in Appendix 1. The common element,
however, was the requirement that no persons from any
SIEV were to land on Australian territory. Many persons
were contained on vessels within Australian territorial wa-
ters, but none were allowed to land, even when land was very
close by.59
As discussed above, the Pacific Solution saw the estab-
lishment of two processing camps on Nauru – one for the
MV Tampa asylum seekers, the other for subsequent arri-
vals – and one camp on Manus Island. The people on board
each SIEV that was not returned to Indonesia were taken to
either Nauru or Manus Island for processing. There is one
exception to this, and that is SIEV 8, which had thirty-one
people on board, and had departed from Vietnam, not
Indonesia. After being detained at Christmas Island for a
short period of time, these people were taken to the Austra-
lian territory of Cocos Island for processing. The reason for
the different processing locations is something that can
only be speculated about, but is probably due to the fact
these asylum seekers were not “secondary” movers and had
not engaged the services of a people smuggler to get to
Australia.
DIMIA developed written scripts to inform the asylum
seekers about where they were being transported to, what
to expect upon arrival, and their future options. The nota-
ble exception is the script used for SIEV 4 – the first group
to be sent to Manus Island – in which the destination does
not seem to have been revealed. Unlike the people taken to
Nauru, this group was not transported by navy vessel;
rather, they were flown to Papua New Guinea.
Volume 21 Refuge Number 4

5. Forcible return to Indonesia
In early October, a request was conveyed to the PSTF to
prepare a report on the feasibility of returning SIEVs to
Indonesia once intercepted. The PSTF discussed the matter
on 11 October 2001 and provided the draft report to the
Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCONS) on 12
October 2001.60
The PSTF report advised that, subject to a number of
limitations particularly relating to the seaworthiness of the
vessel, it was possible to return SIEVs to Indonesia. The
report  acknowledged  that not every vessel could be re-
turned. The overriding considerations would be safety-of-
life-at-sea issues and Australia’s international obligations
to  assist those in distress. Whether or not a vessel was
seaworthy enough to make it back to Indonesia safely
would remain a matter of judgment for the relevant naval
commander.61 Interestingly, the caveats on return did not
include any consideration of people’s claims to be refugees.
The SCONS drafted a minute to be transmitted to Prime
Minister Howard, suggesting that the policy of tow-backs
to Indonesia be instituted, and the Prime Minister agreed
to this policy change on or around 12 October 2001. The
first boat to be subject to the policy was SIEV 5, which was
intercepted on 12 October and held off Ashmore Reef until
17 October, at which time it was escorted back to Indonesia.
The “tow-back” policy essentially constituted the inter-
ception of SIEVs and forcible return of the vessels under
Navy escort to within close proximity of Indonesian terri-
torial waters. Vice Admiral Shackleton, Chief of Navy,
stated that when the Navy takes a ship back to Indonesia,
“we essentially navigate on its behalf, and we leave it within
sight of the Indonesian coast.”62 Australian vessels involved
in tow-backs apparently did not at any stage enter Indone-
sian territorial waters; rather, they escorted the SIEVs to the
edge of the Indonesian contiguous zone, from which point
the SIEVs continued under their own steam back into
Indonesian territorial waters.63
The Indonesian government was apparently notified of
the return of each of the four SIEVs subject to the “tow-back
policy.”64 The official Australian position is that the place
to which each of the boats actually returned is unknown.
However, it is known that one (SIEV 12) ran aground on
Roti Island, just off the coast of West Timor. The Navy
returned the three other SIEVs to the Indonesian waters in
the West Timor area – one near Kupang (SIEV 5) and the
other two near the town of Pepela, Roti (SEIV 7 and 11).65
It is estimated that in total there were over 500 people on
board these four SIEVs.
Given the level of intelligence gathering by Australian
authorities in Indonesia, it is implausible that Australia has
no knowledge of where these boats returned to or what
happened to the people on board. It is also a gross abdica-
tion of the international obligation owed to asylum seekers
to ensure that they are not subjected to refoulement by
Indonesia.66 According to Mr Killesteyn, Deputy Secretary
of DIMIA, Australia’s involvement ceased once the Indo-
nesian government was informed that the boats were re-
turned to Indonesian territorial waters and “[w]hat then
happened in terms of reception arrangements is really a
matter for the Indonesian government.”67 As is apparent
from the discussion below of the Regional Cooperation
Model in place between Australia and Indonesia, it is in fact
inconsistent with the structure and purpose of those ar-
rangements that Australia had no further information on,
or involvement in, the interception, detention, and proc-
essing of those returned to Indonesia.
IV. Regional Cooperation Model with Indonesia
The anti-people smuggling arrangements in place between
Australia and Indonesia are the longest standing and most
developed in the region.68 In early 2000, Australia proposed
a Regional Cooperation Model (RCM) with Indonesia, in-
cluding the co-operation of the International Organisation
for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR. According to DIMIA,
the RCM provides for the interception and detention of
asylum seekers, assessment of protection claims, and ar-
rangements for removal of failed asylum seekers or resettle-
ment of recognized refugees. Under the arrangements in
place, Australia and Indonesia have agreed
to cooperate to disrupt [the flow of unauthorized arrivals] by
taking concerted action to intercept people who are breaching
Indonesia’s immigration laws and to take an active approach to
putting an end to the operations of people smugglers who are
based in Indonesia.69
A. Implementation of the Regional Cooperation Model
In order to ensure that its non-refoulement obligations under
the Refugee Convention were not breached, Australia needed
to ensure that the RCM provided asylum seekers with an
opportunity to have their claims for protection assessed.
UNHCR did not agree to take a leading role in the imple-
mentation of the model, and initially it refused to endorse,
or even participate in, the RCM.70 The function of “lead
agency” was taken on by IOM.
Despite UNHCR’s initial reluctance to be involved, it has
a statutory responsibility to interview anyone who ex-
presses a wish to request asylum.71 Whilst UNHCR did not
agree to assist the Australian government by actively seek-
ing out asylum seekers in Indonesia, it had no choice but to
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agree to assess any claims lodged with its (small) Jakarta
office.72 IOM undertook to inform intercepted asylum seek-
ers of this option.
Under the RCM, the interception of illegal third-country
nationals in Indonesia is the responsibility of local Indone-
sian authorities, primarily the Indonesian National Police
service (INP). Whilst Australia has federal police officers on
the ground in Indonesia, they have no law enforcement
jurisdiction outside Australia. Thus, the stated Australian
policy of disruption and interception required co-opera-
tion from local police in order to be effective. This co-op-
eration is ensured through a protocol concluded in 2000
and renegotiated in 2002 between the two police services,
and is discussed in detail below.
The interception of unauthorized migrants by the INP
predominantly results from Australian intelligence about
the locations and movements of people or from informa-
tion provided by human sources, such as hotel staff or other
informants, to the Indonesian authorities. Any person who
is intercepted by the INP and found to be undocumented,
in possession of fake documentation, or without a valid
Indonesian visa is usually arrested. Once arrested, the per-
sons are transferred to the custody of Indonesian immigra-
tion authorities. IOM, the Australian embassy in Jakarta,
and UNHCR are subsequently advised of the arrests. It
seems that Australia has a tacit agreement with Indonesian
authorities that they will not réfoule people who may be
asylum seekers, despite the fact that Indonesia is not a party
to the Refugee Convention. Australia has not declared Indo-
nesia to be a “safe third country” under the Migration Act
1958, and has no formal readmission agreement with Indo-
nesia. This is particularly concerning as it leaves returned and
intercepted asylum seekers at risk of “chain refoulement.”
Those persons who are intercepted and arrested are then
detained in a variety of places in Indonesia, ranging from
immigration detention facilities to hotels. IOM staff mem-
bers attend the locations where the unauthorized migrants
are being held and arrange for longer-term accommoda-
tion. The Australian government meets the costs of IOM in
providing accommodation, food, and medical assistance to
those detained. IOM also arranges longer-term accommo-
dation if it is required, (for example, while refugee status
determination is conducted by UNHCR).
Regardless of where unauthorized migrants are located,
they remain the responsibility of IOM and are strictly in
“detention” until they leave Indonesia.73 In reality, the de-
tention arrangements are not particularly secure, leading to
a number of persons leaving the accommodation. It is not
known whether those persons have remained in or left
Indonesia, and, if they have left, whether they travelled to
Australia or to some other location.
IOM also has the responsibility of advising those arrested
of their options for the future. These include voluntary
return to their country of origin, return to another country
which recognizes their right of entry, or contacting
UNHCR to make an application for refugee status. Accord-
ing to the Deputy Secretary of DIMIA, the co-operation
with UNHCR
was specifically designed to give these people, who were enjoy-
ing protection in Indonesia at the time, an opportunity to have
their claims assessed and for resettlement processes to start.74
One problem with this approach is that it has lead to a
burden shift from Australia’s onshore processing system,
which is very well-resourced, to the UNHCR’s Jakarta of-
fice, which is chronically under-resourced. Traditionally a
small office, it has not been equipped to process the increas-
ing number of claims lodged in Indonesia for which it is
responsible. This has led to problems of delay in processing
claims. The problems of delay have been compounded by
an unwillingness on the part of states parties to the Refugee
Convention to then resettle designated refugees located in
Indonesia.
People found to have protection needs remain the re-
sponsibility of UNHCR, which then seeks a durable solu-
tion for each refugee, usually in the form of resettlement in
a third country. As  Indonesia is not a signatory to  the
Refugee Convention, no durable solutions are available for
refugees in Indonesia. Those indicating a desire to leave
Indonesia are assisted by IOM to do so and Australia meets
the costs incurred in organizing the voluntary removal of
unauthorized migrants. Approximately 10 per cent of per-
sons intercepted decide to voluntarily return to their coun-
try of origin.75 If a person is found by UNHCR as not having
protection needs, IOM arranges to remove from Indonesia
those wanting to return home, with the costs again met by
the Australian government.
B. Co-operation between Australian Federal Police and
Indonesian National Police
Despite its formal title, the RCM is not a high-level arrange-
ment between governments. Rather, it is a primarily a co-
operative arrangement between the law enforcement
agencies of Australia and Indonesia – the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) and the Indonesian National Police (INP).
The AFP is the law enforcement agency for the federal
government in Australia, and enforces Commonwealth (as
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opposed to State) laws, including the Migration Act 1958
(Cth). In the area of people smuggling, the AFP
engages in targeting facilitators of people-smuggling ventures.
These are the people who arrange for the marketing of opportuni-
ties for potential passengers, organise their travel to embarkation
points, coordinate and provide vessels and employ crews.76
The AFP is also partly responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of the crews of SIEVs for people smuggling
offences under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).77
The co-operative regime between the AFP and the INP
in relation to people smuggling is given effect through a
specific protocol concluded in 2000. On 27 October 1995,
the AFP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Indonesian National Police to co-operate
in the investigation of transnational crime. The MOU was
renewed on 5 August 1997. On 15 September 2000, the AFP
entered into a specific protocol under the MOU “to target
people smuggling syndicates operating out of Indonesia.”78
Two weeks later, on 27 September 2000, a ministerial direc-
tion was issued to the AFP, directing the AFP to “give special
emphasis to countering and otherwise investigating organ-
ised people smuggling.”79
According to the Commissioner of the AFP, Mr. M.
Keelty,
Under the provisions of the Protocol, the AFP did fund INP
units to take part in anti-people smuggling operations … The
Protocol laid out the level of accountability that would have to
be met by the various INP units …
The Protocol allowed for the AFP and INP to provide advice
regarding target selection, technical and management support
of operations, informant management, information facilitation
and assistance in financial reporting.80
Action was taken under the Protocol almost immedi-
ately, including the training of five INP Special Intelligence
Units in October, the provision of equipment to those units
in November and the allocation of funds to coordinate
operations (including the INP Interpol office) and pay the
INP informant network.81
Under the Protocol, however, the AFP “cannot direct the
INP … [w]e can seek their cooperation.” The INP Special
Intelligence Units have been involved in gathering informa-
tion, making arrests and prosecuting Indonesian-based
people smugglers.82 The Special Intelligence Units were also
central to the Australian policy of disruption in Indonesia.
On or around 12 September 2001, the Indonesian gov-
ernment set aside the Protocol. Apparently, it is unclear
why this occurred. The AFP have stated that the only reason
they were given was that the Indonesian government de-
sired a more formal, government-to-government agree-
ment, rather than the “agency-to-agency” arrangement in
place at the time. It was acknowledged, however, that “to a
degree the concern went to the disruption operation."83 The
operation of the Protocol remained suspended until the
conclusion of a new MOU and Protocol on 13 June 2002.
Despite the suspension of the Protocol, the AFP maintains
that they continued to receive co-operation from the INP
“on a case by case basis.”84
The Australian policy of disruption in Indonesia has
been labelled “the untold story of people-smuggling.”85 The
Senate Select Committee pursued this story in some de-
tail, in response to a submission raising questions about
the sinking of a SIEV en route to Australia. This incident
lead  to  the  drowning of 353  asylum  seekers  – mostly
women and children – and has become known as ‘SIEV
X’.86 In pursuing some of the issues raised by the SIEV X
incident, the extent of disruption activities in Indonesia
became apparent.
The primary objective for  disruption activities  is “to
prevent the departure of the vessel in the first instance, to
deter or dissuade passengers from actually boarding a ves-
sel.”87 A distinction was drawn between dismantling and
disruption efforts.
Dismantling is more focused on targeting the critical players,
the facilitators, within the syndicate. So you are actually taking
away a fulcrum for activity … whereas disruption can extend
far beyond the syndicate itself and … target potential passengers
on the vessel to disrupt their getting on board.88
Disruption activities included the interception and di-
version of potential asylum seekers in Indonesia.
By disruption, we mean the use of the Indonesian national
police to divert potential passengers to the International Organ-
isation for Migration or the interception by the Indonesian
national police of passengers prior to boarding vessels. What
would  happen  … is that potential passengers  are gathered
sometimes in a number of locations and at the last moment they
are provided with details or transport to an embarkation point
and they are placed on the vessels at the embarkation point.
Often a disruption activity would be to prevent the passengers
from getting to the point of embarkation or if we knew who the
people smuggler was, to have the Indonesian national police
arrest the organiser, or in other ways to disrupt the gathering of
the people prior to the vessel departing.89
Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum Seekers

Other efforts that may fall within the general description
of disruption activities include the distribution of informa-
tion leaflets discouraging people in Indonesia from using a
people smuggler to get to Australia,90 information cam-
paigns directed at Indonesian fishermen who are usually
recruited by people smugglers as “crew”91 and “soft” en-
forcement measures.
It was the role of the Special Intelligence Units of the INP,
trained by the AFP, to conduct the disruption activities. On
a number of occasions the AFP has emphasized the fact that
Australia does not have the power to direct or command
the INP; “we can seek their cooperation.”92 The INP invari-
ably co-operates. However, the absence of a line of com-
mand raises serious accountability questions. As the AFP
itself has stated, “[w]e don’t know what they are up to but
we know what we have requested of them.”93 The absence
of accountability is particularly alarming in light of the fact
that there appear to be no clear limits placed on disruption
activities.
The Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, Senator
Faulkner, has stated
It is not clear whether disruption extends to physical interfer-
ence with vessels. It is not clear what, if any, consideration is
given in the planning and implementation of disruption to
questions of maritime safety, to the safety of lives at sea.94
These comments were made in response to allegations
aired on a local television program that an informant in
Indonesia had represented himself as a people smuggler.95
It was claimed that the informant – with the knowledge of
either the AFP or the INP, or both – took money from
asylum seekers in Indonesia on the basis that he would
smuggle them to Australia. He claimed to be an Australian
police officer who knew the movements of Australian Navy
ships and so could get them to Australia. After taking
money from the asylum seekers (around $1,000 per person)
he would then hand them over to the authorities in Indo-
nesia. This informant also claims that Indonesian locals
were paid on several occasions to sabotage people-smug-
gling boats with passengers on them.
Senator Ellison, Minister for Justice and Customs, has
refuted any suggestion of an Australian official engaging in,
or requesting the conducting of, this kind of activity.
Upstream disturbance has been a key strategy of the Howard
government in dealing with people-smuggling … Disruption
and deterrence do not equate to sabotage. The Australian Fed-
eral Police has not been involved in sabotaging vessels but it has
been involved in upstream disturbance – that is, disturbing and
disrupting the activities of ruthless people-smugglers.96
Whilst the AFP maintains that it has not requested that
the INP do anything illegal in relation to the disruption of
people smuggling, it acknowledges that it has no way of
knowing exactly what is being done in its name.
We are not privy to what network the INP necessarily used so I
can’t say whether they employed people to do this work on their
behalf … We knew when they arrested people or detained
people, but we are not aware of how they did the other things
they did.97
In relation to the overall policy of disruption of people
smuggling in Indonesia, the majority98 of the Senate Select
Committee concluded as follows
The Committee notes that it has not been able to gather more
detailed information on the  exact nature of the disruption
measures employed in Indonesia. Further, it is concerned about
the general lack of transparency surrounding elements of the
strategy itself. In particular, the inability of the AFP to provide
clear and precise information about the factors behind the
Indonesian Government suspending the protocol governing
the disruption effort compounds the sense of concern that a key
diplomatic partner had cause to abrogate an element of the
bilateral relationship. The Committee finds it perplexing that
neither the AFP nor any other Australian agency took action to
get to the bottom of this matter. The Committee considers that
this matter warrants further investigation and reporting back to
the Parliament.99
The Committee recommended that a full independent
inquiry be conducted into
the disruption activity that occurred prior to the departure from
Indonesia of refugee vessels … with particular attention to the
activity that Australia initiated or was instrumental in setting in
motion through both its partners in the Indonesian govern-
ment and its own network of informants.100
At the date of writing, no steps had been taken towards
the implementation of this recommendation.
V. Assessing the Impact of the Australian Policy
Australia’s comprehensive border protection measures
seem to have been effective in that there have been no boat
arrivals from Indonesia since 16 December 2001. Whilst the
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information campaigns, interception, and diversion activi-
ties in Indonesia have undoubtedly deterred asylum seekers
from voyaging to Australia many of those people simply
remain in Indonesia. The estimated number of people pre-
vented from reaching Australia under the disruption pro-
gram varies; however, in excess of 3,000 people appears to
be a reasonable estimate.101
Whilst it is not possible to solely attribute the reduced
flow of asylum seekers over the past twelve months to Austra-
lia’s comprehensive border protection efforts, the introduc-
tion of the policy has coincided with a complete halt in the
arrival of boats. As the Senate Select Committee noted:
The number of unauthorized boats attempting to reach Austra-
lia has declined dramatically, although the effect of the offshore
processing arrangements and the new legislative regime in halt-
ing the flow of illegal boat arrivals is difficult to isolate from the
influence of other factors, including disruption activities, re-
gional anti-smuggling initiatives, the SIEV X disaster, and
global developments such as increased border security in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001.102
Through the introduction of a comprehensive border
protection regime involving disruption, interdiction, redi-
rection, and mandatory detention, Australia has managed
to completely insulate itself from unauthorized boat arri-
vals of asylum seekers and refugees. For this reason, many
other developed countries have shown particular interest in
the Australian approach.
Most well known is the recent UK proposal for the
introduction of regional protection areas103 – safe areas
where UNHCR will be responsible for providing protection
and humanitarian support to refugees, funded by the states
redirecting asylum seekers to the area. Asylum seekers ar-
riving in the EU would be identity screened at the external
borders of the EU and removed to a regional protection
area, based on their country of origin. Thus, it is proposed
that there be an offshore (or outside EU) processing centre
in Turkey for Iraqis, Somalia for Africans, and Morocco for
Algerians and other Africans. It is made quite clear in the
UK proposal that if UNHCR was not willing to participate
in the scheme, the seemingly more compliant IOM would
be approached. The UK proposal was strongly condemned
by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organi-
zation.104 The proposal was not adopted by the European
Council earlier this year. It is possible that the UK will look
to partners outside the EU to implement the scheme, in-
cluding Australia.105
The parallels between the UK proposal and Australia’s
Pacific Solution are quite striking, particularly the burden
shift onto less developed countries and the UNHCR. Ac-
cording to Human Rights Watch, the UK acknowledges
that  “Australia’s refugee policy is its source of inspira-
tion.”106 One obvious point of distinction between the UK
proposal and Australia’s comprehensive border protection
policy is that the UK policy would require the complete
co-operation of all EU member states in order for it to be
anywhere nearly as effective as Australia’s has been. Austra-
lia’s geography makes it unique in the developed world;
people cannot simply walk or drive across Australia’s borders.
Slow-moving boats that are overflowing with people are read-
ily detectable by a well-resourced and vigilant defence force.
And they are certainly no match for naval warships.
VI. Conclusion
Australia’s border protection policy has generated much
criticism, both domestically and internationally, especially
from UN bodies and non-governmental organizations. The
criticisms have, without exception, been ignored, largely
because the Australian government does not believe it is in
breach of any international obligations. Whilst this position
may prove to be correct, the policy may be viewed as exploit-
ing the greyer areas of refugee law, international human
rights law, and the law of the sea.  The  policy certainly
undermines Australia’s long-standing reputation as a good
international citizen and Australia’s record as a human
rights defender has been seriously tarnished. At best, the
Australian policy pushes the limits of acceptable interna-
tional practice. At worst, Australia has set a new “low water
mark” for the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees.
The interception, return, and redirection of thousands
of people – many of whom were subsequently recognized
as refugees in need of international protection – and the
shameless “burden shift” engaged in by Australia highlights
the lengths to which a wealthy state can and will go to ensure
the meeting of a domestic policy objective. That Australia’s
refugee “problem” is tiny by global standards is an even
greater cause for alarm. It sends a dangerous message to all
states that it is acceptable to “deflect” asylum seekers away
from your territory when you feel that you have carried
enough of the asylum burden. There are many states that
would be far more justified in reaching this conclusion than
Australia. If those states shut their borders to refugees and
asylum seekers, the international refugee protection regime
would be seriously jeopardized. Given the costs involved in
hosting large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers,
many host states will see the Australian policy as a tanta-
lizing prospect. It is hoped that they resist the temptation
to expand the Pacific Solution into a “European Solution”
or an “Atlantic Solution.”
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Appendix 1
Summary of SIEV Incidents 2001
SIEV Date
(2001)
Where Australian
vessel
Action Outcome
Palapa 27/8-3/9 In vicinity of
(IVO) Christmas
Island
Norwegian
freighter MV
Tampa
Held in Australian
territorial waters by
SAS Transferred to
HMAS Manoora
Transported to
Nauru (UNHCR
processing)
1 7-8/9 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Warramunga Transferred to
HMAS Manoora
Transported
to Nauru
2 10-22/9 Aground
Ashmore Reef
Newcastle,
Gawler
Vessel foundered – held
off Ashmore on board
SEIV 1. Transferred to
HMAS Tobruk
Transported
to Nauru
3 12-22/9 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Warramunga,
Geelong
Held off Ashmore Reef.
Transferred to
Tobruk Reef
4 6-10/10 IVO
Christmas Island
Adelaide Taken under tow; SIEV
foundered, rescued
Disembarked at
Christmas Island.
Taken to Papua New
Guinea (Manus)
5 12-19/10 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Warramunga
Whyalla
Townsville
Escorted to AI lagoon
Removed to Indonesian
territorial waters
Indonesia – Kupang,
West Timor
6 19-30/10 IVO
Christmas Island
Arunta
Warramunga
Held in custody by AFP
& AQIS Attempted
escort to Indonesian
territorial waters
Vessel foundered,
returned to
Christmas Island.
Taken to Nauru
7 22-29/10 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Bunbury,
Arunta, Bendigo
Held at Ashmore
Escorted to Indonesian
territorial waters
Indonesia – Pepela,
Roti Island
8 29/10-10/11 North-west
Bathurst Island
Wollongong Escorted to Ashmore and
held there Transferred to
HMAS Tobruk
Transported to &
disembarked at
Christmas Island
SIEV 9 passengers
then taken to Cocos
Is, most of SIEV 8 &
10 to Nauru. Some
held at Christmas
Island until 26 Jan
02 then transferred
to Nauru
9 31/10-10/11 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Arunta,
Bunbury,
Gladstone
Towed to Ashmore Reef
and held there
Transferred to HMAS
Tobruk
10 8/11 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Wollongong Vessel caught fire and
sank. 2 deaths
Transferred to HMAS
Tobruk
11 11-13/12 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Leeuwin Escorted to Indonesian
territorial waters
Indonesia – Roti?
12 16-20/12 IVO
Ashmore Reef
Leeuwin Escorted to Indonesian
terr>torial waters
Indonesia – Roti?
X 19-22/10 Departed
Sumatra
(Indonesia)
Vessel sank en route to
CI, either in
international waters
south of Java or in IDTS
(Sunda Straits)
421 passengers &
crew including 70
children. 24
disembarked en
route. 352 drowned.
44 survivors (3 kids)
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